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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
deavored to establish a new precedent. "' Legal writers have sided with the
dissenting judges, in urging an overthrow of precedent, where the reason
for the rule has failed.17
In the instant case, the court did justice by refusing to follow the hard
and fast non-liability rule. In classifying drunken driving as a wilful tort,
that is, one committed intentionally TM or where there is knowledge that
the act will result in injury, and an utter disregard of the consequences,",
the court allowed the unemancipated minor child to sue his parent. Here,
the wrongful conduct of the father had disrupted the peace, security, and
tranquility of the home. Since the reason for the rule was not present, the
rule itself should not be applied.
The principal case is merely the expression of a trend away from the
decision in the 1891 case of Hewlett v. George. Gross injustice has prevailed merely because precedent has been followed blindly. Suits between
parents and children could be allowed with little disruptive effect when, as
here, the parent is guilty of a wilful or malicious act, for the family relationship has already beei disrupted. Since financial hardships within the family
can be alleviated by insurance, indemnifying parents against loss, no logical
reason exists for refusing to allow such suits to redress obvious injustices.
TRUSTS - RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
SEVERABILITY OF REMAINDERS
Upon the death of one of the four children of testator's son, the surviving children brought suit to invalidate the will in part. The testator died
in 1890 leaving a gift in trust as a life estate to his son with a remainder over
to his grandchildren and then upon the death of each grandchild, his or her
share in the principal sum to pass according to the intestate laws of Pennsylvania. All of the grandchildren were living when the testator died and
none were born thereafter. The lower court declared the gifts in remainder
to the heirs of the deceased child void under the rule against perpetuities.
Held, in reversing on appeal, that the remainders to the heirs of the testator's
grandchildren who were living when the testator died are valid and separable from a void remainder to the-heirs of a possible afterborn grandchild
of testator. In re Harrah'sEstate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950).
A plenary power of disposal is not incident to the ownership of property.
The rule against perpetuities manifests a public policy which is repugnant
16. See the vigorous dissent of justice Clark in Small v. Morrison, sujra note 6, at
588, 118 S.E. at 17; also, the dissent of Justice Crownhart in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W. 787, 788 (1927).
17. McCurTdy, supra note 11, at 1056-1081; Notes, 18 B.U.L. REV. 468 (1938);
7 FoRD L. REv. 459 (1938); 28 Cco. L. 1.430 (1939) (when there is indemnity liability
insurance); 79 U. ov PA, L. REV. 80 (1930) (when there is indemnity liability insurance
or great injustice).
18. Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kan. 172, 71 Pac. 318 (1903).
19. See Bessemer Coal, Iron & Land Co. v. Doaks, 152 Ala. 166, 44 So. 627 (1907).
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to remotely vesting interests that encumber the free marketability of property. An acceptable version of this rule is that: "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."- The general construction of the rule is
that a bequest is void if there is any possibility that a future interest may
vest beyond the period allowed by law.?
A devise of an execitory limitation to a class presents a situation which
has not been uniformly resolved by the courts. 4 There has been soine attempt to formulate a general rule, separating class gifts partially invalid
tnder the rule against perpetuities, when the testamentary scheme of disposition is not destroyed.-- These cases, however, rely heavily on an analogy
to the well established Pennsylvania rule that, subject to a contrary intention
on the part of the testator, valid life estates will be sustained notwithstanding the fact that ultimate estates may vest in remainder beyond the limits
allowed by law." Several views in resolving this class gift problem have
arisen in the law. A strict rule, previously followed in Pennsylvania, is that
if the interest of any member of the class may vest too remotely, the whole
gift fails. Supplementing this, arc the views that separation of class gifts
will be allowed; when (1) the bequest is, in fact, a specific gift to each
1. See Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299
US. 561 (1936); Northern Trust Co. v.Porter, 368 I1. 256, 263, 13 N.E.2d 487, 491
(1938); lord v.Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 688, 186 S.W.2d 896, 899 (1944); Ryan v.Ward,
64 A.2d 258 (Nid. 1949); Barton v.Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 351, 92 Atl. 312, 313 (1914);
T'hcllusson v. Woodford, 4 Vcs. 227. 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 162 (Ch. 1799).
2. GRAY, ThE RULE AGAINSr PErerurii:s § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
3. Smith's Estate v. C.I.R., 140 F,2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944); Equitable Trust v.

McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 Atl. 203 (1933); Keefer v.MeCloy, 344 Ill.
454, 176
N.E. 743 (1931); Nicol v.Morton, 332 Ill.
533, 164 N.E. 5 (1929); Easton v. Halt,
323 111.397, 154 N.E. 216 (1927); Banker's '[rust Co. v.Carver, 222 Iowa 196, 268

N.W. 568 (1936); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.Douglas, 134 Ky. 374, 120
S,\V. 328 (1909); Coleman House v.City of Asbury Park, 129 N.J. Eq. 399, 19 A.2d
889 (1941); In re Lawton's Estate, 143 Misc, 1059, 20 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Surr. Ct. 1940);
Inre Barnes' Estatc, 155 Misc. 320, 279 N.Y. Supp. 217 (Surr. Ct. 1935); In re Friday's
Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 Atl. 123 (1933). Contra: PA. S'rAT. tit. 20 § 301.4(b) (1947).
4. Sec 2 SINLEs, 'mn LAw OrFrURE INTERLESTS § 364-366, 528 (1936); Leach.
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 ItARtv. L. RFv. 649 (1938); Leach, The Ride against
Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 IHtARv. L. Rrv. 1329, 1348 (1938); Powell, Nut
shells and Perpetuities, 7 U. or Cut. L.REv. 489-495 (1940).
5. See In re Maltinan, 195 Cal. 643, 651, 234 Pac. 898, 902 (1925); In re Van
Wyck, 185 Cal. 49, 62, 196 Pac. 50, 56 (1921); Lepard v.Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 35,
66 Atl. 780, 782 (1907); Johnstont v.Preston, 226 Ill.
447, 458, 80 N.F. 1001, 1004
(1907); Eldred v.Meek, 183 Ill. 26, 38, 55 N.E. 536, 540 (1899); Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v.Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 SA.V 3;7, 360 (1924); Springfield Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Ireland, 268 Mass. 62, 66, 167 N.E. 261, 263 (1929); In re Kern's Estate,
296 Pa. 348, 357, 145 At!. 824, 826-828 (1929); 2 SINLEs, Op. cit. supra note 4, at § 529.
6. In re Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 Atl. 85 (1938); In re McCreary's Estate,

328 Pa. 513, 196 Atl. 25 (1938); In re Kern's Estate, 296 Pa. 348, 145 At]. 824 (1929);
In re McCaskey's Estate, 293 Pa. 497, 143 Atl. 209 (1928); In re Feeney's Estate, 293
Pa. 273, 142 At]. 284 (1928); In re Jones' Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 90, 130 AtI. 314 (1926);

In re Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922); In re Whitman's Estate, 248 Pa.
285, 93 Aft. 1062 (1915); In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 Afl. 897 (1898).
7. In re Kountz' Estate, 213 Pa. 390, 62 Atl. 1103 (1906); Appeal of Coggins,
124 Pa. 10, 16 AtL 579 (1889); Lcak v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 36 Eng. Rep. 979
(1817); 2 Smus, op. cit. srnpra note 4, at §§ 526, 527.
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member of the class;' or (2) where the membership of the class is definitely
fixed within the period allowed by law;9 and (3) where the gift is to a subclass derived from an earlier class, the gift to one particular sub-class being
valid even though the gift to another sub-class is void for remoteness. 10
In Pennsylvania, the common law rule that the possibility of a remotely
vesting interest at its creation measures the validity of a gift, has been
abridged by statute to make actualities at the end of the period control."
Statutory innovation in the rule against perpetuities has not resolved all the
problems incident to this branch of the law,' 2 but while subject to criticism,' 3 this statute tends towards a more equitable distribution of otherwise
void gifts and furthers a trend upholding the intentions of the testator
4
rather than harsh bars to the free alienation of property.'
Since the testator's son, in the instant case, might conceivably have had
a child after the death of the testator, who possibly could have had children
born more than twenty-one ycars after the death of the last of testator's
children, the gift contemplates a possible remainder which would be void
under the rule against perpetuities. The death of the testator in 1890 precludes the application of the 1947 Pennsylvania statute which would have
validated the gifts in question since all the children involved were actually
born before the death of the testator. Controlling then, is the rule of
Leake v. Robinson"a to invalidate the entire gift. The court, in the noted
case, first concedes the separability of valid life estates from void remainders. 16 In reviewing the authority urged by the appellants, they include law
which, if applicable, would seemingly validate the gifts in question.' T Although it appears that the court was influenced by this authority, it was not
expressly relied upon. Rather, dicta from the cases splitting valid life estates
from ultimate void remainders is cited as a basis for separating the class gift
here in question. "Horizontal separability" as effected by the rationale of
the cases separating valid life estates from void remainders is juxtaposed
supra note 2 at § 389;
8. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 389(a) (1944); GRAY, op. cit.
2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 528.
9. REST^'rEMEN'r, PROPERTY § 389(a) (1944); GRAY, op. cit. s pra note 2, at

§ 392.

10. Smith's Estate v.C.I.R., 140 FT2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944); Shepard v. Union &

New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 AtI. 809 (1927); Bowerman v. Taylor, 126

Md. 203, 94 Atl. 652 (1915); Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 AtI. It (1888); Dorr v.
Lovering, 147 Mass. 530, 18 N.E. 412 (1888); Hill v. Simmons, 125 Mass. 536 (1878);
Cattlin v. Brown, 11 flare 371, 69 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Ch. 1853); RESTATEMENT, PRopCit.
ERTY § 389(b) (1944); GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 389-398.2; 2 SIMES, OP?.
supra note 4 at § 528; 51 HAuv. L. REv. 1329, 1347 (1938).
11. PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 301.4(b) (1947).
12. See Legis., Legislative Interference With the Rule Against Perpetuities, 46 IIARv.
L. RE,v.701 (1933).
13. See Phipps, The Pennsylvania Experiment inPerpetuities, 23 TEMPLE L. Q. 20
(1949); Legis., 60 HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1947); Legis., 97 U. oF PA. L. Rev. 263, 268270 (1948).
14. See LegIls., 60 HaRv. L. REv. 1174 (1947); Legis., 97 U. oF PA. L Rev. 263,
268-270 (1948); Legis., 23 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 311 (1948).
15. See note 7 suf~ra.
16. See In re larrah's Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587, 592 (1950).
17. Compare In re Harrah's Estate, suopra note 16, with cases cited note 10 suf!ra.
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against the facts of the instant case and provides the basis for the "vertical
separability" of valid remainders from void remainders."'
In effect, the court applied the current statute sub silentio, perhaps in
an effort to provide case law for similar questions in the future which might
not have benefit of the statute. The law from foreign jurisdictions which,
if applied, would have effected the identical result, is passed up seemingly
by the reluctance of the court to overrule themselves with foreign law.
While the noted case does present a violation in law of the rule against
perpetuities, there is no violation of the purpose of the rule in fact. This
allows a decision in keeping with the present trend to maintain the testator's
plan of distribution and lends support to the public policy evidenced by
statutory revision of the rule against perpetuities.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER-TREATY OF UNITED STATESSUPERSEDES STATE- LAW
An alien, ineligible to attain citizenship in the United States of America
because of ancestry,1 received land in the State of California by grant deed.
The state claimed that this acquisition was in violation of the Alien Land
Law 2 of that state, which forbids aliens not able to attain citizenship from
owning land. It was further contended that, by another provision of this
same act,3 the land which had been deeded to this alien had escheated to
the state. Held, that since the United Nations Charter is a treaty, the
Alien Land Law, which is in direct conflict with the Charter, must yield to
its superior authority. Set Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950).
The President of the United States has the power to negotiate treaties
with other sovereign nations and, upon advice and consent of the Senate,5
these documents with the Constitution and Laws of the United States become the supreme law of the land.6 The judiciary in an effort to declare
the force and effect of treaties have divided them into two categories: one,
immediately operative, is called a self-executing treaty;7 the other, needing
implementing legislation, is labeled executory.8 United States treaties are
usually found to be self-executing contracts, 9 but those instruments which
18. See note 16 supra.
1. 42 STAT. 1022 (1922); 46 STAT. 1511 (1931); 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1946).
2. CAL. GEN. LAws, ACT. 261, § l&2 (Deefing, 1944 Ed.).

3. CAL. GEN.

LAws,

Act. 261, § 7 (Deering, 1944 Ed.).

4. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
5. U.S. CONST. ART. 11, § 2.
6. U.S. CONST. ART. VI, § 2.

7. Asakura v. Seattle, 215 U.S. 332 (1924); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S.
1829); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944);
General Electric Co. v. Robertson, 21 F.2d 214 (D. Md. 1927), rev'd 32 F.2d 495 (4th
Cir. 1929).
8. Robertson v. General Electric Co., supra note 7; Ex parte Dove, 49 F.2d 817 (D.
Minn. 1925); American Express Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. App. 146 (1913).
9. Amaya v. Stanolind Oil &Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1946).

